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Three striking empirical regularities have been repeatedly reported: the 
positive correlation between housing prices and trading volume, and 
between  housing  price  and  time-on-the-market  (TOM),  and  the 
existence of price dispersion. This short paper provides perhaps the 
first unifying framework which mimics these phenomena in a simple 
competitive  search  framework.  In  the  equilibrium,  sellers  with 
heterogeneous waiting costs and buyers are endogenously segregated 
into  different  submarkets,  each  with  distinct  market  tightness  and 
prices. With endogenous search efforts, our model also reproduces the 
well-documented  price-volume  correlation.  Directions  for  future 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Both casual observations and serious empirical research agree that the housing 
market is characterized by a strong decentralized pattern of exchange with 
severe search frictions. In sharp contrast to the predictions from traditional 
Walrasian settings, empirical "anomalies" such as price dispersion in the real 
estate market, nontrivial time-on-the-market (TOM) positively associated with 
housing  prices,  positive  correlation  between  housing  prices  and  trading 
volumes, etc., are repeatedly reported. This paper is among the first few efforts 
to  develop  a  unifying  competitive  search  framework  with  heterogeneous 
sellers to illustrate the behavior of the housing market reflected in the above 
empirical findings. 
 
The  modeling  choice  is  indeed  intuitive.  The  existence  of  price  and  rent 
dispersion naturally leads one to a search-theoretic setting (for instance, see 
Gabriel  et  al.,  1992;  Leung  et  al.,  2006;  Plazzi  et  al.,  2008)  to  depict  a 
decentralized  pattern  of  exchange.  Another  necessary  condition  for  price 
dispersion is the heterogeneity on the seller's and/or the buyer's side, which 
generates corresponding submarkets (Diamond, 1971). In most cases in reality, 
these submarkets are partially segregated since some of the sellers or buyers 
are free to flow between these submarkets. As a consequence, a competitive 
search framework may suit the issue better than traditional search-theoretic 
settings. 
 
To simplify the exposition, we focus on one-side heterogeneity and assume 
that sellers are different in terms of their waiting costs.
1 The assumption of 
heterogeneity in the waiting cost variables attempts to capture the differing 
financing costs, as well as the search efforts and costs among different house 
sellers. Some sellers are more pressed to sell the house since the financing 
costs of alternative funding recourses are high, for instance, when they are on 
the verge of bankruptcy. Other sellers may want to sell their houses as soon as 
possible since they will be relocated to another place, and the pecuniary and 
opportunity costs to deal with the housing selling p rocedure are considerably 
large compared with their gains/losses from selling the house . They are the 
"fire-sale" sellers in our model.
2 Meanwhile, our model also contains other 
sellers who are willing to wait for better prices. On the buyer side, we include 
homogeneous waiting costs to reflect their lodging and search -related costs 
when they are looking for a suitable house to purchase. 
 
There are various ways to deal with heterogeneity in housing search issues. 
For instance, one can consider identical and  fully segregated submarkets to 
                                                           
1 Adding other heterogeneities in the setting would not change our principal results, 
but will significantly complicate the algebra. 
2 Needless  to  say,  the  model  can  be  reformulated  to  have  identical  sellers  and 
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investigate vacancy issues. As a result, the prices and TOMs are the same in 
all the submarkets.
3 In contrast, we adopt a competitive search framework 
based on the seminal work in Moen (1997),
4 to investigate heterogeneous and 
partially  segregated  submarkets,  where  buyers  are  free  to  enter  either 
submarket. As a result, the price and the expected TOM in one submarket may 
differ from those in another submarket. Moreover, in cases with exogenous 
shocks, this framework allows us to illustrate how these submarkets interact 
with each other due to the flavor of the ex ante competitiveness embodied in 
this framework. 
 
This is in contrast to earlier search -theoretic frameworks that explain price 
dispersion, such as Axell (1974), Butters (1977), Reinganum (1979), von zur 
Muehlen (1980), Burdett and Judd (1983), Diamond (1985), Rob (1985), 
Salop and Stiglitz (1985), Benabou (1988, 1992a,b, 1993), and Rauh (2001). 
They have focused on commodity markets with take -it-or-leave-it offers. In 
such markets, all the goods are alike, and sellers can easily adjust their 
inventory. As a consequence, TOM is not an important issue. In contrast, 
houses usually differ from each other in one way or another. Moreover, it 
takes a long time to build a house. Thus, inventory adjustment is much more 
difficult. Sellers have to sell what they have, and thus the tradeoff between the 
selling price and the speed of sales is crucial. Our continuous time framework 
also captures the fact that negotiation with buyers is more frequent than that in 
commodity markets. 
 
In our model, sellers with higher waiting costs, i.e. those in the "fire -sale" 
situation, are willing to accept lower prices, which attract a larger number of 
potential buyers so that the house would be sold faster. As a consequence, the 
prices in the two submarkets would differ, and lower (higher) prices would be 
associated  with  shorter (longer) TOMs.   These theoretical predictions are 
consistent with the empirical findings. For example, Merlo and Ortalo-Magné 
(2004)  find  that  sellers  post  different  prices  to  target  various  types  of 
consumers,  while  the  submarket  with  a  higher  listing  price  has  a  lower 
matching rate and a longer TOM. Leung, Leong and Wong (2006) find that 
price dispersion in the housing market is non-trivial. Moreover, the degree of 
price dispersion after controlling the traits of the house can be explained by 
the movements of the macroeconomic variables. In the context of commercial 
real  estate,  Plazzi,  Torous  and  Valkanov  (2008)  also  find  significant  rent 
dispersion.  In  this  paper,  the  degree  of  dispersion  is  determined  by  the 
distribution  of  the  seller's  waiting  costs,  which  is  in  practice  affected  by 
macroeconomic  conditions.  A  positive  correlation  between  TOM  and 
transaction price is found in the work of Kang and Gardner  (1989), Forgey et al. 
(1996), Leung, Leong and Chan (2002), and Anglin et al. (2003), among others. 
 
                                                           
3 For instance, see Wheaton (1990). 
4 It is close to a directed search, or a directed matching framework that originated in 
Peters (1991) and Montgomery (1991). See also Becsi et al. (2005). Leung and Zhang    314  
 
In addition, we can also demonstrate a positive relationship between housing 
prices  and  trading  volume  in  the  cases  with  shocks  in  the  demand-side 
variables,  such  as  the  residential  value  of  houses,  and  waiting  costs  and 
reservation values of buyers. This is in line with the traditional wisdom based 
on  supply-demand  analyses,  as  well  as  empirical  findings  in  Fisher  et  al. 
(2003),  and  Leung,  Lau  and  Leong  (2002).  Intuitively,  in  the  cases  with 
higher (lower) residential values, and lower (higher) reservation  values, or 
lower (higher) waiting costs of buyers, the houses are relatively more (less) 
attractive. As a result, the housing price would rise (fall), and potential buyers 
would inflow to (outflow from) the town, which leads to a larger (smaller) 
transaction volume. In this regard, this paper provides an alternative search-
theoretic explanation on the positive correlation between housing prices and 
trading volume, other than the down-payment explanation.
5 More specifically, 
the down-payment effect model by Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) seems to 
capture the short-run dynamics while this paper focuses on the steady state 
relationship. It is consistent with the empirical finding of Leung, Lau and 
Leong (2002), which suggests that the short -run dynamics of the housing 
market is driven by a down-payment effect, where the longer-run relationship 
between housing price and trading volume is due to search friction. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: a baseline model with 
competitive search and heterogeneous waiting costs will be introduced in the 
next section. The results will be presented and discussed in order. In the  
concluding remarks, we will compare the competitive search model presented 
here with a theme park visit in intuitive ways. Future research directions will 
also be discussed.   
 
 
2.  A Baseline Model of Housing Price Dispersion 
 
2.1.  A Tale of Two Submarkets 
This section outlines the formal model. The horizon of the model is infinite 
and time is continuous. There is a continuum of sellers who have different 
waiting costs, so that some of them are more pressed to sell the house than 
others. For simplicity, we focus on the case with only two types, impatient 
and patient sellers. The principal result, however, can be generalized to a more 
general setting. Furthermore, without loss of generality, the waiting cost for 
the impatient sellers, c
H, is higher than that of patient ones, c
L, c
H > c
L > 0. Let   
S
i be the population (or measure) for the sellers with a flow waiting cost of c
i, 




 as the measures of buyers who focus 
on the two "submarkets", respectively. Notice that the "submarkets" need not 
                                                           
5 For  the  down-payment  effect  model,  see  Stein  (1995),  Ortalo-Magne  and  Rady 
(2006), and Chen and Leung (2008), among others. Recently, Clayton, Miller and 
Peng (2010) find support for both down-payment and search-theoretic models from 
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be geographically separated. They simply represent the trading which involve 
type i sellers, i=H, L. The impatient sellers, who are pressed to sell the house, 
may  post  this  information  on  an  advertisement,  so  that  buyers  can  easily 
distinguish  between  the  two  types  of  sellers.  For  simplicity,  we  assume 
complete and perfect information between the agents. In the type-i submarket, 
the buyer's waiting cost is κ. 
 
In  each  submarket  i,  i  =  H,  L,  the  number  of  successful  matches  in  an 
infinitesimal period is governed by a random matching function, M (B
i, S
i), 
which  exhibits  a  constant  return  to  scale  in  B  and  S,  with  positive,  but 




i in the sense that it is more difficult for a buyer to find a seller in a 
tighter market.
6  For each submarket i, we can define η
i as the flow matching 
rate for a buyer to find a seller in submarket i such that 












                                     (1) 
Similarly, the flow matching rate for a seller to find a buyer, μ
i, satisfies 









                                    (2) 
We can denote Mj (.)
 
as the first derivative of the matching function M with 
respect to the j-th argument. Note that the assumed feature of the matching 
function suggests that Mj (θ
i, 1) = Mj (1, 1/ θ
i) since the first derivative of a 
constant-return-to-scale function must be homogeneous of degree zero. As a 
result, we use these two expressions interchangeably. 
 
2.2.  Housing Prices and Bellman Equations 
In this model, sellers with different waiting costs could post different prices to 
differentiate  each  other.  The  actual  price  P
i  in  the  submarket  i  would  be 
determined by a Nash bargaining solution, which will be discussed in the next 
subsection. Let Π
i denote the value for type-i sellers, V
i the value for type-i 
buyers (who are still searching the market, but have not owned houses), for 
i=H, L, and Ω the value of a house owner, which is independent of the waiting 
cost level. Since the buyers are free to enter each of the two submarkets, the 
values of all types of buyers, V
i
, are also the same as the reservation values 
(i.e. the value for outside options),V , i.e.  V V
i  , for i=H,L. For simplicity, 
we assume that both V and Ω are exogenously determined. 
 
As standard in the literature, we assume that buyers and sellers maximize the 
expected value of the sum of the periodic utility flow, which is constantly 
                                                           
6 Needless to say, we can also define the market tightness from a seller perspective. 
The results in this paper will not change under this alternative definition of tightness. Leung and Zhang    316  
 
discounted  by  the  rate  r.  Given  the  model  structure  outlined  above,  the 
dynamic optimization of the buyers and sellers can be summarized by the 
following Bellman equations, i=H, L,  
 
i i i i i r c P                                                     (3)  
 
i i i i rV P V                                        (4) 
From Equation (3), we can obtain: 
/
/1
i i i i i i
i
ii




   
  

      ,                                   (5) 
i=H, L. Note that 1/μ
i is actually the mean waiting time for the buyers. Hence, 
Equation (5) means that the value of the seller equals the discounted net gain 
from selling a house, while the net gain is the price net of the waiting cost 
during the waiting period. 
 













                                             (6) 
i=H, L. The intuition of (6) is analogous to that of Equation (5). 
 
2.3.  The Bargaining Process 
The  housing  price  is  determined  by  a  Nash  bargaining  solution  with  the 
bargaining power of the seller as α. This means that the seller and buyer will 
solve the following joint surplus maximization problem: 
      , max
1   
    
i i i i
P V P P i i=H, L. The solution is: 
   . 1
i i i V P                                               (7) 
Equation (7) says that the price is the weighted average of two objects: one is 
the value of the seller, Π
i, and the other is the net gain from being a buyer (or 
a house-searcher) to a house owner between  
i V   . Thus, to  solve  for the 
house price, it is necessary to solve for the equilibrium values of the seller and 
buyer. From Equations (5), (6), and (7), we can solve Π
i, 
i V  and
i P , i=H, L. 
 














                                    (8) 
   









   

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                                  (10) 
 
2.4.  Buyer's Free Entry and the Price-TOM Relation 
Since buyers are free to enter either submarket, the buyer's values should be 
the same as the reservation values for outside options. Hence, 
V V V
L H   .                                                   (11) 
Note  that  the  right -hand  side  of  Equation  (9)  is  increasing  at
i c ,  and 
decreasing at
i  , i=H, L.  While 
L H c c   and (11), we have: 
L H L H       , , and 
L H    .                            (12) 






    ,  
which suggests that the housing price is decreasing at θ
i. Thus, the transaction 
prices of the two submarkets are indeed different, with the expected result that 
the submarket of impatient sellers (higher waiting cost) would sell at a lower 
price, 
L H P P  .                                                  (13) 
Note that since the expected TOM is 1/μ
i, i=H, L, we can combine (12) and 
(13)  and  obtain  Proposition  1  on  the  price-TOM  relation  in  the  housing 
market.  
 
Proposition 1 (Price-TOM Relation): In a competitive search framework with 
heterogeneous  waiting  costs  for  sellers  and  free  entry  for  buyers,  the 
submarket with a higher (lower) price must have a longer (shorter) expected 
TOM. 
 
This result is intuitive. In cases where sellers are eager to sell the house, house 
price  must  be  lower  than  usual.  In  observing  a  possibly  low  price,  more 
buyers  would  crowd  into  that  market  segment,  which  leads  to  a  higher 
probability of matching, and a shorter TOM. Empirically, Merlo and Ortalo-
Magné (2004) find that sellers post different prices and the submarket with a 
higher  listing  price  has  a  lower  matching  rate  and  a  longer  TOM.  The 
empirical evidence in Kang and Gardner (1989), Forgey et al. (1996), Leung, 
Leong  and  Chan  (2002),  Anglin  et  al.  (2003),  among  others,  support 
Proposition 1. 
 
2.5.  Price Dispersion 
The following proposition simply repeats (13). Leung and Zhang    318  
 
 
Proposition 2 (Price Dispersion): In the current competitive search framework, 
housing prices would be different even for identical houses. Specifically, the 
seller with higher waiting costs would ask for a lower housing price, in an 
effort to reduce the waiting costs by selling the house faster. 
 
The above results are in line with the empirical findings. Leung et al. (2006) 
find  that  price  dispersion  cannot  be  only  attributed  to  randomness  or 
econometric mis-specification as the degree of price dispersion systematically 
varies with some macroeconomic variables. In addition, Plazzi, Torous and 
Valkanov (2008) also find empirical rent dispersion in the commercial real 
estate market. 
 
2.6.  Comparative Statics and Price-Volume Correlation 
On top of the two major propositions, we can also derive the comparative-
statics results, which are summarized by the following table: 
 
Table 1  Comparative Statics for the Model with a Costly Search Effort  
i=H,L  c
i   κ   Ω   α    V  
θ
i  +  -  +  -  - 
μ
i  +  -  +  -  - 
η
i  -  +  -  +  + 
P
i  -  -  +  +  - 
Π
i  -  -  +  +  - 
M (B
i, S
i)  +  -  +  -  - 
Price-Volume Co-movement  -  +  +  -  + 
 
 
Note that the trading volume for a given period is proportional to the matching 
rate, M (B
i, S
i), and therefore, we can deduce the price-volume co-movements 
from the table above. While the intuitions are in fact straightforward, it may 
be instructive to present the explanations in a more systematic manner. 
 
1.  When sellers are more eager to sell their houses, in the case that their 
waiting costs (c
i) are higher, house prices would be lower. As a result, 
more buyers would be attracted to the economical supply of housing, thus 
leading to a higher buyer-seller ratio (market tightness), higher selling rate 
and lower buying rate. In this case, a lower price would be associated with 
a higher trading volume. 
2.  On the other hand, given the outside values of the buyer (for instance, 
potential buyers may prefer to have leisure time instead of involvement in 
house-searching), a higher level of buyer's waiting cost (κ) may discourage 
them  from  entering  the  market  at  all,  which  results  in  a  lower  market 319    “Fire Sales” in Housing Market 
 
 
tightness (i.e. a lower buyer-seller ratio). House price would be lower, as 
compensation for the greater difficulties in house-searching, so that the 
"returns"  from  house  searching  will  match  the  alternatives.  Thus,  we 
would observe a lower price and a smaller trading volume (and hence a 
positive price-trading volume correlation). 
3.  When the benefits from owning a house and living in the economy (Ω) are 
greater, more buyers would be attracted by the economic potentials,  and the 
market tightness is higher. With more demand, the house price is driven 
higher. Thus, a higher price is associated with higher trading volume (and 
hence a positive price-trading volume correlation). 
4.  If the seller's bargaining power (α) is relatively larger, then the house price 
is higher. Meanwhile, some buyers would leave the market, which leads to 
lower market tightness and a lower trading volume. 
5.  While  the  buyer's  entry  value  ( V )  is  higher,  some  buyers  will  not 
participate in house searching activities, which results in a lower market 
tightness,  and  thus  a  lower  price  (and  hence  a  positive  price -trading 
volume correlation). 
 
Some economists insist on framing the house market as if it has a downward 
sloping  demand  curve  and  an  upward  sloping  supply  curve.  We  can  then 
rephrase the result in the price-volume co-movements in Proposition 3:  
 
Proposition  3  (Comparative  Statics  and  Price -Volume  Correlation):  In the 
baseline model with a fixed entry value for the buyers and fixed number of 
sellers,  housing  prices  and  the  trading  volumes  would  move  in  the  same 
direction as if the system has been hit by a demand shock, such as changes in 
the buyer's waiting costs, the values for owning a house, or the buyer's entry 
values. On the other hand, housing prices and trading volumes would move in 
the  opposite  directions  as  if  the  system  is  hit  by  a  supply  shock,  such  as 
changes in the seller's waiting costs, or the seller's bargaining power.  
 
Empirically, Fisher et al. (2003), and Leung, Lau and Leong (2002), among 
others, find strong contemporary co-movements between housing prices and 
trading  volumes,  while  Leung,  Lau  and  Leong  (2002)  also  find  that  price 
would lead the trading volume by 24-48 months in the monthly data. 
 
 
3.  Conclusion 
 
To a certain extent, the idea behind this paper is analogous to a theme park 
visit. In the popular theme parks, visitors do not know ex ante whether it will 
be very crowded or not; if they would need to wait in a long queue before they 
can enjoy some of the rides or the haunted house. They can choose to buy a 
more expensive "VIP-pass" and save some waiting time, or buy the cheaper Leung and Zhang    320  
 
normal  pass  and  hope  that  they  will  not  need  to  wait  that  long  ex  post. 
Normally, people with a higher "waiting cost" such as tourists would prefer 
the more expensive options. For others, they will prefer to wait. Thus, time-
on-the-queue (TOQ) will be negatively related to the price of the "pass". 
 
Similarly, some sellers in this paper have higher waiting costs than others, and 
prefer to sell their houses in a submarket with higher "liquidity." Unlike the 
theme park visit, however, the supply side of the housing market is endogenous. 
The buyers will take the strategies of the sellers as given and then self-select 
into different submarkets. Moreover, while pass-purchasing is certain, house-
purchasing is not. Even within each sub-market, there is a random matching 
process among potential buyers and sellers. Moreover, while the price of the 
pass is given, the housing price in each submarket will be determined through 
a Nash bargaining process, which will in turn, depend on the market-tightness 
of the corresponding submarket. 
 
Perhaps more importantly,  this paper differs from the theme park visit example 
in  that  there  are  three  stylized  facts  for  this  paper  to  mimic,  namely,  the 
existence of price dispersion, positive correlation between the market price 
and trading volume, and that between the transaction price and TOM. The 
empirical  "anomalies"  found  against  the  Walrasian  predictions  can  be 
explained  within  our  competitive  search  framework.   The  free-entry 
assumption implies a positive correlation between housing prices and TOM. 
With the introduction of costly search efforts, buyers with higher waiting costs 
are more eager to purchase a house, and hence put forth more search efforts. 
The increase in search intensity would lead to higher trading volumes. It also 
holds in the case with a positive shock in the waiting costs. In addition, we 
show that price dispersion can easily exist even with perfect information and 
perfect competition in the ex ante sense, as long as the trades are decentralized. 
 
The current model, of course, can be further improved. For instance, in this 
model, both the reservation values of a house buyer (or house searcher) and 
the values of a house owner are exogenously determined. Future work should 
endogenize these values in a more general model. The model also implicitly 
assumes that there is some  “commitment”  mechanism on the seller’s side. 
Recall that in the model, sellers with different waiting costs self select into 
different “sub-markets,” say, by advertisements. We also assume that once a 
match between a potential seller and potential buyer is made, the price will be 
determined by Nash bargaining. In that case, sellers with a higher waiting cost 
(“Fire Sale”) would sell at a lower price. This attracts more potential buyers to 
that sub-market. Hence, from the seller’s point of view, the “Fire Sale sub-
market” will have a higher matching rate.  However, patient sellers (sellers with 
lower  waiting  costs)  may  find  it  profitable  to  enter  that  sub-market,  and 
pretend that it is a Fire Sale. Thus, this model demands sellers to truthfully 321    “Fire Sales” in Housing Market 
 
 
reveal  their  situations  and  commit  to  “stay”  in  that  sub-market.  Future 
research should relax such an assumption.
7 
 
Future  work  can  also  be  extended  in  other  directions.  For  instance, 
"middlemen"  are  missing  in  this  analysis.  Previous  partial  equilibrium 
analyses  (such  as  Yavas,   1994,  1995)  show  that  the  introduction  of  an 
intermediary may affect the equilibrium configuration, and efficiency under 
some conditions. Second, Zenou (2009) has studied the location of various 
types of workers in a search theoretic framework. It will be  interesting to 




Third, the search friction in the housing market may influence the asset 
portfolio, as illustrated by Anglin and Gao (2010). It would be interesting t o 
explore  the  general  equilibrium  implications  for  such  a  consideration. 
Moreover, while this paper focuses on heterogeneity in waiting costs, future 
research may explore the situation jointly with financial constraints and search 
frictions.  Another possib ility for  future research is to  merge the current 
housing market model with a conventional neoclassical framework, as in 










The authors are grateful to Paul Anglin, Morris Davis, Bob Edelstein, Qian 
Gong, Yiting Li, John Quigley, Chung  Yi Tse,  Ping Wang, William Wheaton, 
Abullah Yavas, as well as seminar participants of the AREUEA conference,  
City University Brown Bag, Hong Kong Economic Association conference, 
International  Conference on  Real Estates and Macroeconomy at the  China 
Center for Economic Research in Peking University, Midwest Macroeconomics 
Meetings at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, MIT Center for Real 
Estate for many helpful comments and suggestions; and City University of 
Hong  Kong  for  financial  support.  Personally,  Zhang  would  like  to  thank 
Disneyland  and  Leung  would  like  to  thank  Universal  Studios  for  the 
interesting experience which inspired this paper. The usual disclaimers apply. 
 
                                                           
7 Among others, see Tse and Leung (2011) for some earlier efforts on this issue. 




Anglin, P., (2004), The Value and Liquidity Effects of a Change in Market 
Conditions, Working Paper, University of Windsor. 
 
Anglin, P. and Y. Gao (2010). Integrating Illiquid Assets into the Portfolio 
Decision Process, Real Estate Economics, forthcoming. 
 
Anglin, P., R. Rutherford, and T. M. Springer, (2003), The Trade-off between 
the  Selling  Price  of  Residential  Properties  and  Time-on-the-Market:  The 
Impact of Price Setting, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 26, 
95-111. 
 
Axell,  B.,  (1977),  Search  Market  Equilibrium,  Scandinavian  Journal  of 
Economics, 79, 20-40. 
 
Becsi, Z., V. Li, and P. Wang, (2005), Mismatch in Credit Markets, Washington 
University at St. Louis, Mimeo. 
 
Benabou, R., (1988), Search, Price Setting and Inflation, Review of Economic 
Studies, 55, 353-376. 
 
Benabou, R., (1992a), Inflation and Markups: Theories and Evidence from the 
Retail Trade Sector, European Economic Review, 36, 566-574. 
 
Benabou, R., (1992b), Inflation and Efficiency in Search Markets, Review of 
Economic Studies, 59 (2), 299-329. 
 
Benabou, R., (1993), Search Market Equilibrium, Bilateral Heterogeneity, and 
Repeat Purchases, Journal of Economic Theory, 60 (1), 140-158. 
 
Berkovec, J. A., and J. L. Goodman Jr., (1996), Turnover as a Measure of 
Demand for Existing Homes, Real Estate Economics, 24, 421--440. 
 
Burdett, K. and K. L. Judd, (1983), Equilibrium Price Dispersion, Econometrica, 
51, 955-970. 
 
Butters, G., (1977), Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices, 
Review of Economic Studies, 44(3): 465-91. 
 
Chen, N. K. and C. K. Y. Leung, (2008), Asset Price Spillover, Collateral and 
Crises: With an Application to Property Market Policy, Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics, 37, 351-385.  
 323    “Fire Sales” in Housing Market 
 
 
Clayton, J., N. Miller, and L. Peng, (2010), Price-Volume Correlation in the 
Housing  Market:  Causality  and  Co-movements,  Journal  of  Real  Estate 
Finance and Economics, 40, 14-40. 
 
Coulson, E. and L. Fisher, (2007), Housing Tenure and Labor Market Impacts: 
The Search Goes On, Penn. State University, Mimeo. 
 
Diamond,  P.,  (1971),  A  Model  of  Price  Adjustment,  Journal  of  Economic 
Theory, 3(2), 156-168. 
 
Diamond, P., (1987), Consumer Differences and Prices in A Search Model, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 429-436. 
 
Diamond, P., (1993), Search, Sticky Prices, and Inflation, Review of Economic 
Studies, 60, 53-68. 
 
Fisher,  J.,  D.  Gatzlaff,  D.  Geltner,  and  D.  Haurin,  (2003),  Controlling  for 
Impact of Variable Liquidity in Commercial Real Estate Price Indices, Real 
Estate Economics, 31, 269-303 
 
Forgey,  F.  A.,  R.  C.  Rutherford,  and  T.  M.  Springer,  (1996),  Search  and 
Liquidity in Single-Family Housing, Real Estate Economics, 26, 273-292. 
 
Gabriel, S., J. Shack-Marquez, and W. L. Wascher, (1992), Regional House 
Price Dispersion and Interregional Migration, Journal of Housing Economics, 
2, 235-256. 
 
Harding,  J.  P.,  S.  S.  Rosenthal,  and  C.  F.  Sirmans,  (2003),  Estimating 
Bargaining Power in the Market for Existing Homes, Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 85, 178-188. 
 
Hong, P., R. P. McAfee, and A. Nayyar, (2002), Equilibrium Price Dispersion 
with Consumer Inventories, Journal of Economic Theory, 105, 503-517. 
 
Kang, H. B., M. J. Gardner, (1989), Selling Price and Marketing Time in the 
Residential Real Estate Market, Journal of Real Estate Research, 4(1), 21-35. 
 
Lach, S., (2002), Existence and Persistence of Price Dispersion: An Empirical 
Analysis, Review of Economics and Statistics, 84, 433-444. 
 
Lagos, R. and R. Wright, (2005), A Unified Framework for Monetary Theory 
and Policy Analysis, Journal of Political Economy, 113, 463-484. 
 
Leung, C. K. Y., (2004),  Macroeconomics and Housing:  A Review of the 
Literature, Journal of Housing Economics, 13, 249-267. 
 Leung and Zhang    324  
 
Leung, C. K. Y. and D. Feng, (2005), What Drives the Property Price-Trading 
Volume Correlation? Evidence from a Commercial Property Market, Journal 
of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 31, 241-255. 
 
Leung, C. K. Y., Y. C. F. Leong, and I. Y. S. Chan, (2002), TOM: Why Isn't 
Price Enough?, International Real Estate Review, 5, 91-115. 
 
Leung, C. K. Y., G. C. K. Lau, and Y. C. F. Leong, (2002), Testing Alternative 
Theories of the Property Price-Trading Volume Correlation, Journal of Real 
Estate Research, 23, 253-263. 
 
Leung, C. K. Y., Y. C. F. Leong, and S. K. Wong, (2006), Housing Price 
Dispersion: An Empirical Investigation, Journal of Real Estate and Financial 
Economics, 32, 357-385. 
 
Merlo,  A.  and  F.  Ortalo-Magné,  (2004),  Bargaining  over  Residential  Real 
Estate: Evidence from England, Journal of Urban Economics, 56, 192-216. 
 
Moen, E. R., (1997), Competitive Search Equilibrium, Journal of Political 
Economy, 105, 365-411 
 
Montgomery, J. D., (1991), Equilibrium Wage Dispersion and Interindustry 
Wage Differentials, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 163-179. 
 
Ortalo-Magne, F. and S. Rady, (2006), Housing Market Dynamics: On the 
Contribution of Income Shocks and Credit Constraints, Review of Economic 
Studies, 73, 459-485. 
 
Peters,  M.,  (1991),  Ex  Ante  Price  Offers  in  Matching  Games  Non-Steady 
States, Econometrica, 59, 1425-1454. 
 
Plazzi,  A.,  W.  Torous,  and  R.  Valkanov,  (2008),  The  Cross-Sectional 
Dispersion  of  Commercial  Real  Estate  Returns  and  Rent  Growth:  Time 
Variation and Economic Fluctuations, Real Estate Economics, 36(3), 403-43. 
 
Reinganum, J. F., (1979), A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion, 
Journal of Political Economy, 87, 851-858. 
 
Rauh, M. T., (2001), Heterogeneous Beliefs, Price Dispersion, and Welfare-
Improving Price Controls, Economic Theory, 18, 577-603. 
 
Read, C., (1991), A Price Dispersion Equilibrium in a Spatially Differentiated 
Housing  Market  with  Search  Cost,  American  Real  Estate  and  Urban 
Economics Association Journal, 19, 532-547. 
 325    “Fire Sales” in Housing Market 
 
 
Rob, R., (1985), Equilibrium Price Distributions, Review of Economic Studies, 
52, 487-504. 
 
Salop, S. and J. E. Stiglitz, (1982), The Theory of Sales: A Simple Model of 
Equilibrium  Price  Dispersion  with  Identical  Agents,  American  Economic 
Review, 72, 1121-1130. 
 
Stein, J. C., (1995), Prices and Trading Volume in the Housing Market: A 
Model with Downpayment Constraints, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 
379-406. 
 
Tse, C. Y. and C. K. Y. Leung, (2011), Job Searchers, House Searchers and 
Investors, University of Hong Kong, Mimeo. 
 
Von Zur Muehlen, P., (1980), Monopolistic Competition and Sequential Search, 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2, 257-281. 
 
Wheaton, W. C., (1990), Vacancy, Search, and Prices in a Housing Market 
Matching Model, Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1270-1292. 
 
Yavas, A., (1994), Middlemen in Bilateral Search Markets, Journal of Labor 
Economics, 12(3), 406-429. 
 
Yavas,  A.,  (1995),  Can  Brokerage  Have  an  Equilibrium  Selection  Role?, 
Journal of Urban Economics, 37, 17-37. 
 
Zenou, Y., (2009), Urban Labor Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 




Proof for the Comparative Statics  
From (8) to (11), we know that the equilibrium is determined by the following 
equations, i=H, L,  
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Notice that there is no direct dependence of market i variables (i.e. P
i, Π
i) on 
the market j variables (i.e. P
i, Π
i), i,j=H, L, and  j i  . In this sense, the two 
sub-markets are “segmented.” Thus, we can first solve the market tightness, 
and then the values and prices, and worry less on the cross-market effects. 
Consequently, the effects from exogenous variables, including c
H, c
L, κ, Ω, α 
can be figured out. 
 
Observe that the buyer's value is increasing in c
i, and decreasing in θ
i, i=H, L. 
For instance, when c
H increases, θ
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i=H, L. Recall that both V and Ω are exogenously determined. Thus, a change 
in c
i, will only go through a change in η




L would not change. In this case, a lower price would 
drive higher trading volume. Similarly, when c
L increases, θ








would not change, and we also have higher trading volume accompanied with 
lower prices. This is in line with responses to supply shocks. 
 
Note that the buyer's value is decreasing in both κ and θ
i, i=H, L. Thus, if the 
buyer's waiting cost, κ, is larger, θ
i
 would be smaller. Note that 
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Notice that the first term in the expression above is directly independent of κ. 
As 
i r   ,     
i i r       1  are all positive, V is decreasing in κ. 
 
Furthermore, 
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Thus, we can re-write  
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i are lower due to a smaller θ
i, i=H, L, in the case of a 
higher value of κ. 
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Now, let us consider the effects from a higher Ω. Note that the buyer's value is 
increasing in Ω and decreasing in θ
i, i=H, L. Hence, a higher Ω would attract 
more immigrants, and raise θ
i, i=H, L. Since 
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Thus,   V     is increasing in Ω, and hence, so is P
i, i=H, L.  
 
An alternative way to see the positive correlation between Ω, and P
i, i=H, L is 





















i, an increase in θ
i (due to an increase in Ω) would lead to an 
increase in P



















Therefore, an increase in θ
i
 (due to an increase in Ω) would lead to an increase 
in Π




Now, we want to investigate the implication of a change in the bargaining 
power α. Observe that buyer’s value is decreasing in both α and θ
i. So the 
market  tightness  would  be  smaller  when  the  seller’s  bargaining  power  is 
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When α increases, η
i will also increase, and hence the house price  P
i will 
increase as well. At the same time, both 1/ (1α) and 1/η
i increase with α. 
Thus Π
i increases, i=H, L.  
 
If the buyer's entry value (V ) is higher, market tightness must be lower. Both 
house  price  and  seller’s  values  would  decline,  since  both  P
i  and  Π
i  are 
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Q.E.D. 
 